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Voluntary contributionsWemeasure people's pro-social behavior, in terms of voluntarymoney and labor contributions to an archetypical
public good, a bridge, and in terms of voluntarymoney contributions in a public good game, using the same non-
student sample in rural Vietnam at four different points in time from 2005 to 2011. Two of the observed events
are actual voluntary contributions (one in terms of money and one in terms of labor), one is from a natural ﬁeld
experiment, and one is from an artefactual ﬁeld experiment. Despite large contextual variations, we ﬁnd a strong
positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between voluntary contributions, whether correcting for other
covariates or not. This suggests that pro-social preferences are fairly stable over longperiods of time and contexts.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The present paper investigates the stability of social preferences by
utilizing unique data on people's voluntary contributions to an arche-
typical public good, a bridge, and contributions in a public good game.
The analysis is based on two observations of voluntary contributions,
one natural ﬁeld experiment on contributions to a real bridge in rural
Vietnam, and one artefactual ﬁeld experiment on contributions in a
public good experiment, conducted from 2005 to 2011 and using the
same sample consisting of all (about 200) households in a village in
rural Vietnam. Thus, we obtain repeated information on people's pro-
social preferences over a long period of time.
An overwhelming amount of psychological and behavioral econom-
ics research shows that theHomo Economicus characterization of human
behavior, in terms of complete selﬁshness in a narrowmaterial sense, is
often importantly wrong; human behavior is in part pro-social. At the
same time, a large heterogeneity in pro-social behavior is typically
found. Several studies have consequently attempted to categorize
people, based on their experimentally observed behavior, in terms of
different types of social preferences, e.g., as free riders, conditional46 31 786 10 43.
. Carlsson),
,
. This is an open access article undercooperators, and unconditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al., 2001);
as selﬁsh versus inequity-averse individuals (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999); and as non-sharers, reluctant sharers, and willing sharers
(Lazear et al., 2012). Yet, from these studies one cannot conclude that
people are inherently of different types. An alternative explanation is
that people simply act differently at different points in time, and that
people's degrees of cooperativeness, or non-selﬁshness, are approxi-
mately constant on average. Indeed, that people's pro-social actions
vary over time is obvious since most of us sometimes contribute to a
certain charity and sometimes not. Yet, howmuch of the observed het-
erogeneity in social preferences that can be explained by within-people
variations is not clear, nor is it clearwhether it is signiﬁcantlymore like-
ly that an individual who acted cooperatively at one point in time is
more likely to act cooperatively in a similar task several years later.
Moreover, even if people are of different types with respect to pro-
social preferences, it is an important research issue to ﬁnd out whether
these types are stable over longer periods of time.
The present paper is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst in economics to sys-
tematically investigate whether pro-social preferences, manifested in
terms of cooperative behavior, are fairly stable over several years. In
contrast, the extent towhichpreferences, and in particular social prefer-
ences, are stable over a short period of time, and also across decision en-
vironments, has been studied in a number of papers with different
methods.
Some studies have looked at the differences in pro-social behavior
between similar experiments conducted at different points in time.
For example, Brosig et al. (2007) conducted dictator and public goodthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
4 There is also a large (although often questioned) literature in psychology arguing that
there are ﬁve basic dimensions of the human personality: openness, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. The empirical analysis in this literature is
most often based on surveys with verbal questions trying to capture these dimensions,
and it is often argued that individual measures along these dimensions are rather stable
over time. For example, Jang et al. (1996) found, based on a twin sample, that approxi-
mately 40% of the variation in agreeableness, which reﬂects a tendency to be cooperative,
trusting, and helpful rather than antagonistic, can be explained genetically.
5 Moral licensing (e.g., Monin and Miller, 2001; Mazar and Zhong, 2010) suggests that
people who have undertaken a praiseworthy act get an implicit license for subsequently
conducting a more selﬁsh act, whereas moral cleansing (e.g., Carlsmith and Gross, 1969;
Tetlock et al., 2000) refers to the ﬂip side where a morally blameworthy act induces com-
pensatory behavior. Thus both mechanisms work in the direction of reducing the correla-
tion between pro-social actions over time. In the present case, we argue that, unlike most
previous tests of the stability of social preferences, the time periods are sufﬁciently far
away such that the effects of moral licensing and cleansing are presumably small.
6 This does of course notmean that pro-social behavior is independent of the social con-
text. For example, donations to charitable organizations have been shown to depend on
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of one week. Other-regarding behavior was found to decrease over
time, and in the ﬁnal experiments the subjects' behavior was close to
that predicted by conventional economic theory. Subjects who behaved
selﬁshly were found to be the only ones who behaved stably over time.
This pattern is similar to the one typically obtainedwith repeated public
good games.3 Volk et al. (2012) had subjects participate in a series of
three identically designed public good experiments over a period of
ﬁve months. At the aggregate level, cooperation preferences were sta-
ble. However, at the individual level there was considerable variation.
Classifying subjects into three categories – conditional cooperators,
free riders, and others – it was found that half of the subjects remained
in the same category in all three experiments.
Other studies have looked at differences in pro-social behavior be-
tween different experiments (with the same subjects). Blanco et al.
(2011) ran four different experimental games: dictator, ultimatum,
sequential-move prisoners' dilemma, and public good games, and test-
ed whether the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity aversion model can
explain the results. They found that the model could explain the results
reasonably well at the aggregate level, but that it performs considerably
lesswell at the individual level. DeOliveira et al. (2012) found that pref-
erences for contributing to public goods are positively related across dif-
ferent experimental decision contexts, and also positively related to
self-reported donations and volunteering outside the laboratory.
Yet other studies have compared contributions in the lab and in the
ﬁeld. Benz andMeier (2008) conducted a dictator gamewith two social
funds as external recipients and found a positive, albeit relatively weak,
correlation between subjects' behavior in a lab experiment and actual
charitable giving. Laury and Taylor (2008) found mixed evidence re-
garding the correlation between non-selﬁsh behavior in laboratory ex-
periments and contribution to a charitable organization. While they
found that somemeasures of altruistic behavior in the lab could be pre-
dictive of contributions to the charity, the relationships were generally
weak, and some measures of altruism were even negatively correlated
with contribution to the charity. Based on a trust game in Peru, Karlan
(2005) found that subjects identiﬁed as trustworthy, i.e., receivers
who returned a relatively large share of what they received from the
senders, tend to repay their microcredit loans to a larger extent than
thosewhowere not identiﬁed as trustworthy in the experiment. No sig-
niﬁcant correlation between those identiﬁed as trusting, i.e., senders
who sent a relatively large share to the receivers, and repayment of
the loans was obtained. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) found that ﬁsher-
men in Brazil who are more cooperative and patient in lab experiments
are also less likely to exploit the common pool resource in the sense that
they use shrimp traps with bigger holes (where small shrimp can es-
cape) and ﬁshnets with larger mesh sizes (where only bigger ﬁsh are
caught). Algan et al. (2013) combine an online experiment with ﬁeld
contribution data for 850Wikipedia contributors. They found that actu-
al contributions toWikipedia are strongly related to levels of reciprocity
as revealed by both a conditional public good game and trust game.
However, they found only weak links with altruism as revealed by dic-
tator game contributions.
Cesarini et al. (2009) used a different approach based on twin
studies combined with modiﬁed dictator experiments to determine
the extent to which giving is heritable. Their best point estimate sug-
gests that genes explain about 20% of the variation in behavior
among subjects and hence that social preferences, as manifested in
giving behavior in dictator experiments, are in part explained genetical-
ly. Yet, this is not necessarily a goodmeasure of the degree to which so-
cial preferences are constant over time. First, a certain genetic set-up
may in principle induce variation in behavior over time. Second, there3 See, e.g., Isaac et al. (1984), Andreoni (1995), and Fehr and Gächter (2000). Different
explanations have been proposed, including initial confusion and learning (e.g., Andreoni,
1988) and some version of conditional cooperation (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001;
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010).aremany environmental factors thatmaywork in the direction of stabi-
lizing social preferences, e.g., the development of close relations and
social norms.4
In summary, most of the studies discussed above point in the direc-
tion that social preferences are partly stable over different domains and
over time, although the extent of the stability varies between studies to
a rather large extent. Themain contribution of the present paper is that
it investigates the stability of social preferences over long periods of
time, where also the contexts differ; we observe behavior in four differ-
ent periods: in 2005, 2009, 2010, and 2011. As a result of the relatively
long time between our events, we argue that we can also more or less
rule out the potentially confounding effects of compensatory behavior
due to moral licensing and moral cleansing.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
four observations of voluntary contribution and the design of the two
experiments, and provides the corresponding background statistics.
Section 3 presents the results. We ﬁnd strong positive and statistically
signiﬁcant correlations between voluntary contributions in these
events, whether correcting for other covariates or not, suggesting that
pro-social preferences seem to be quite stable over long periods of
time.6 Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The four observed events of pro-social behavior
We use observations of subjects' pro-social behavior in four related
events in 2005, 2009, 2010, and 2011, i.e., implying rather long time pe-
riods between events and a total study period of about six years. Two of
the events (in 2005 and 2010) are naturally occurring ones where we
simply observed the behavior, and the other two (in 2009 and 2011)
were designed by the authors. Two of the events (in 2005 and 2009)
concern monetary contributions to a local public good in terms of the
construction of a crucial bridge in the middle of the village, one of the
events (in 2010) concerns labor contributions to construction of
the same bridge, while the last experiment (in 2011) was a public
good experiment not related to the bridge at all. The ﬁrst three observa-
tions, i.e., in 2005, 2009, and 2010, deal with a real event related to the
construction of a bridge. The event in 2009 canmoreover be classiﬁed as
a naturalﬁeld experiment, whereas the last experiment is an artefactual
ﬁeld experiment, i.e., a lab experiment conducted in the ﬁeld with a
non-student sample.
All four events focus on voluntary contribution mechanisms, and al-
though there are a number of contextual differences, in each instance
we observe the behavior of the same (approximately 200) subjects,
representing all households in the village. The events were undertaken
in the Giong Tromhamlet,7 in theMekong river delta of Vietnam,wherethe information about what other people donate (see, e.g., Bardsley and Sausgruber,
2005; Alpizar et al., 2008; Frey andMeier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2009) and onwhether
the action is observed by others or not (Soetevent, 2005; Hoffman et al., 1996; List et al.,
2004).
7 A hamlet is a small village or part of a village and consists of around 100 to 300
households.
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ly good shape). Most households in the hamlet are engaged in rice cul-
tivating activities.8 The hamlet suffers from a problem that is common
in the Mekong river delta: lack of basic infrastructures such as rural
roads, bridges, and irrigation canals. The government only provides
larger public goods such as roads between villages, whereas small-
scale infrastructures within a hamlet are considered to be the responsi-
bility of the hamlet.
2.1. The bridge and the voluntary contributions
The bridge is important for the village because villagers use it to go to
the riceﬁelds, to themarket, to school, and to visit friends, given that the
bridge is in sufﬁciently good condition. If they do not use the bridge,
they have to choose one of two other routes, each located parallel to
and about 1200 m from the bridge's pathway; see the map in Fig. 1.
There are people living on both sides of the canal, and there is also im-
portant infrastructure on both sides of the canal. For example, the
main market is located on the north side of the canal, while the school
is located on the south side. For all but a few households, the travel dis-
tance to reach the destinations on the other side is considerably longer if
they cannot use the bridge.
The ﬁrst three observations of pro-social behavior, to be described
next, concern funding of a bridge for the hamlet.
2.2. The 2005 event
In the ﬁrst event in 2005, the hamlet council had decided to try to
build a bridge, which was to be funded by voluntary contributions. A
group of three delegated individuals visited every household in the
hamlet to present the plan to build the bridge and to ask for voluntary
contributions. Probably in order to persuade villagers and increase con-
tributions, the delegates showed a list of names, contribution amounts,
and signatures of those who had already contributed. The hamlet coun-
cil did not set an upper contribution limit, and the highest contributed
amount was 300,000 dong.9 Since the total contribution was not sufﬁ-
cient to build a concrete bridge, the hamlet council decided to build a
wooden bridge. Yet, the bridge became degraded relatively quickly,
and in 2009 it looked like in the picture in Fig. 2 and could obviously
not be used for tractors and motorbikes.
The full list of contribution amounts from each household was kept
by the hamlet council and made available to the authors of this paper.
2.3. The 2009 experiment
In collaboration with an NGO, we conducted a ﬁeld experiment
using a threshold public good game that concerned the funding of a
new bridge for the hamlet in 2009. Fifteen experimenters were recruit-
ed via advertisements and a careful selection procedure at the Universi-
ty of Economics Ho Chi Minh City. The selected experimenters received
extensive training and spent nearly oneweek practicing the experiment
in role-play pairs and for pilot interviews with farmers. Moreover, the
selected experimenters also had experience from similar ﬁeldwork in
a neighboring rural area. A list of likely questions and answers related
to the project was provided and the experimenters were repeatedly
told about the importance of using the exact wordings prescribed in
the script. For a detailed description of the experiment and the results,
see Carlsson et al. (2013).
The main objective of the experiment was to investigate the role of
social inﬂuence for voluntary contributions to public goods.We devised
a threshold public good game, in which each of the 200 households8 There are slightlymore than 200 households that administratively belong to the ham-
let. However, a small group of households live separated from the rest and have no use of
the bridge at all, and were not included in any of the events.
9 At the time of the experiment, 100,000 dong = 5 USD.received a 400,000 dong endowment from the NGO and had the option
to either keep the money or contribute some or everything to the
funding of the bridge. The threshold level was set at 40 million dong,
meaning that if all villagers together would contribute at least
40 million dong, the bridge would be built; otherwise it would not.
The threshold was explained as follows:
The concrete bridge will be established if all families together contribute
at least 40 million dong. This means that if the total contribution is
equal to or above 40 million dong, the project will use these 40 million
dong, addmore funding in order tomeet the costs of the bridge, and take
the responsibility to build the bridge. If the total amount of money col-
lected exceeds 40 million dong, the excess amount will be returned to
your family according to the proportion you contributed.If the families
are unable to contribute a total of 40 million dong, your contribution
will be returned to you, and the concrete bridge will not be built.
The experiment involved ﬁve randomly distributed treatments as
follows: 1. Baseline casewith no reference contribution level and no de-
fault option. 2. High reference contribution level (300,000 dong) and no
default option. 3. Low reference contribution level (100,000 dong) and
nodefault option. 4. No reference contribution level and a default option
at zero contribution, and 5. No reference contribution level and a default
option at full contribution (400,000 dong) of the endowment.
The reference contribution levels were conducted by providing the
subjects with information about a typical previous contribution of
others. These numbers, in turn, were obtained from an initial treatment
where we did not tell the subjects anything about others' contributions.
The default options were conducted using a metal card with 9 different
contribution levels. A magnetic token was initially put at the 0 dong
level or at the 400,000 dong level. The subjects were then asked to
move the token to the amount that they wanted to contribute to the
public good. In all treatments, the contributions were anonymous to
everybody except the solicitors, i.e., the contributionswere not revealed
to any parties. Since the households contributed enough to reach the
threshold, the new bridge was built in early 2010; see the picture in
Fig. 3.2.4. The 2010 event
During the planning of the construction, we had a meeting with the
head of the hamlet and representatives from the farmers' association. At
themeeting, wewere informed that they planned to ask the villagers to
contribute labor to connect the road with the new bridge. We took this
opportunity to collect another naturally occurring contribution data set.
As the construction work required joint efforts in a short period of time,
three and a half day were scheduled for the joint work. Two persons
from the hamlet council visited the households in the hamlet to invite
villagers to contribute labor. Hence, an important difference compared
with the previous two events is that instead of being asked formonetary
contributions, they were asked for labor contributions.
Since some households were not expected to be able to contribute
any labor at all, mainly because the household members were too old,
not all households were asked to make contributions. In total 19% of
the households were not asked to make any labor contributions.10 At
this time, households were not told anything about what others were
contributing, and there was no provision point. We hired an external
supervisor who monitored the construction progress and quality, and
recorded villagers' labor contributions. Thus, what we observe in this
event is the actual amount of labor contributions, and not what they
promised when asked to contribute.10 Estimating a binary probit model where the dependent variable is equal to one if they
were not asked to contribute, we ﬁnd that small and poor households and households
with an old head or a female headweremore likely not to be asked. This is all as expected.
Fig. 1.Map of the studied village.
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While the bridge is presumably useful to all households, the useful-
ness varies with, e.g., the distance to the bridge and ownership of differ-
ent vehicles. Althoughwe have information on the use of the bridge, it is
possible that we still cannot perfectly correct for it in our analysis. In
order to avoid such potentially confounding effects, it makes sense to
also include an experiment that by design is not at all related to the
bridge.
The experiment conducted in 2011was therefore not in anyway re-
lated to the bridge or the 2009 experiment, and no reference to either
the bridge or the earlier experiment was made. While the 2009 experi-
ment was funded by an NGO, the 2011 experiment was conducted and
funded by the University of Economics Ho ChiMinh City. There were 15
experimenters also in this experiment. They were recruited and trained
in a similar manner as for the 2009 experiment, but none of them were
the same as in the 2009 experiment. The experiment was conducted in
the subjects' homes and the ﬁrst part of the experimental script read:
Hello, my name is […] I'm working for University of Economics Ho Chi
Minh City, which is implementing an economic study in this village. I
would like to invite you to participate in an economic experiment,
which will be conducted now.You will be taking part in an experiment
on decision-making and will earn some money by choosing among al-
ternatives. The experiment is designed so that your earningswill depend
on your choices, aswell as on the choices of others. Your earningswill be
paid to you in cash tomorrow afternoon privately to preserve the conﬁ-
dentiality of your earnings. The results from this study will only be used
for academic purposes, and no other people in the village will have in-
formation about your choices.Fig. 2. The wooden bridge built from the 2005's contributions.Wechose to conduct a public good game,much like a standard linear
public good game conducted in laboratory experiments. Yet, in order to
ﬁt the setting of the village, and in order to be able to easily compare the
contribution behavior in this experiment with the other experiments,
the group consisted of all households in the village; thus, the size of
the groupwas approximately 200 subjects. Each of these households re-
ceived 200,000 dong, which was clearly a substantial amount for them.
Just as in a standard laboratory public good experiment, they had to de-
cide howmuch of the endowment to keep and howmuch to put into a
group account. In order to make the experiment simple to understand,
each subject was told that any money that was put into the group ac-
countwould be doubled by the experimenter, and that the total amount
in the group account would be distributed to the group members, and
hence to the households. The following sentenceswere part of the script
that the experimenters read to the subjects.
This experiment is organized with a group of 200 households including
yours. We will give 200,000 dong to each of the 200 households partic-
ipating in this experiment. Here is the agreement, which has a signature
and stamp from the University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City stating
that 200,000 dong belongs to your household. Your household and each
of the other households have to decide howmuch of the 200,000 dong to
keep and how much to put into a group account.The amount of money
you put into a group account will ﬁrst be doubled by the experimenter,
meaning that if you transfer 1 dong into the group account, it will be-
come 2 dong. The total amount will then be divided equally between
all households.
The instructions included several examples, and the subjects were
allowed enough time to understand everything that was said. To informFig. 3. The concrete bridge built from the 2009's contribution.
Table 1
Characteristics of the four events.
Characteristics Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4
Time July 2005 August 2009 March 2010 September 2011
Contribution mechanism Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary
Anonymity No Yes No Yes
Framework Fundraising campaign Threshold public good game Voluntary contributions Public good game
Windfall money No Yes No Yes
Contribution range [0, .) thousand dong [0, 400] thousand dong [0, 3.5] labor days [0, 200] thousand dong
Organizer Local government Outside NGO Local government University
Reference contribution Yes Yes in some treatments No No
108 F. Carlsson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 117 (2014) 104–114the subjects that their contributions would be kept completely conﬁ-
dential, the experimenters told them before they made their contribu-
tion decision: “No one in the commune, not even the ofﬁcials, will
know about your decision. We will keep your contribution information
completely secret.”
2.6. Summary of the four events and household characteristics
Asmentioned, the ﬁrst three events were related to the bridge in the
hamlet. The ﬁrst event concerned monetary contributions to build a
small wooden bridge in 2005; the second concerned monetary contri-
butions to build a new and better concrete bridge in 2009; and the
third event concerned voluntary labor contributions to connect the
road to the new concrete bridge in 2010. The fourth event was instead
a public good experiment that was not related to the use of the bridge.
The settings of the four events are summarized in Table 1.
While we designed only two experiments (the 2009 and 2011 ex-
periments), we have data for four different points in time, i.e., 2005,
2009, 2010, and 2011, for essentially the same subjects. Table 2 reports
background statistics, as of 2009, for the households. There were a total
of 200 households from the village that participated in the events. How-
ever, as explained above, not all households were asked to contribute
labor in the 2010 event, and in the last experiment four of the house-
holds were unable to participate.11
Themeanmonthly household income is around 1.8 million dongper
month. This amount corresponds to about 95 USD per month, which is
less than one USD per household member and day. Thus, the house-
holds in the study are poor, and the average level of education is very
low. The average size of land on which a family is currently cultivating
rice is also rather small, approximately half a hectare.
3. Results
3.1. Average contributions in the four events
Before looking at the correlations between the contributions, let us
brieﬂy look at Fig. 4, which displays the histograms of contribution in
each of the events.
As can be seen, the contribution patterns are strikingly different, in
particular between the 2005 and 2010 events, on the one hand, and
the 2009 and 2011 events on the other. The 2009 and 2011 events
have in common that they are based on windfall endowments, which
may contribute to the substantially higher contribution levels in these
events.12 Comparing the 2005 and 2009 contributions, which were
both in terms of monetary contributions to a new bridge, there are
thus strikingly large differences. Themean contribution in 2009 was al-
most seven times as large as in 2005 (270,000 dong compared with
40,000 dong), and while almost everyone contributed something in11 One of the households was attending a funeral, and in the other three households the
household head was working outside the village at the time of the experiment.
12 There are a few tests of the effects of windfall endowments in public good experi-
ments. Cherry et al. (2005) and Clark (2002) found no evidence of a windfall-gain effect
on contributions, while Kroll et al. (2007) found signiﬁcant differences in a public good ex-
periment with heterogeneous endowments.2009, almost half of the households chose to free ride in 2005. While
there may be many different explanations for this, two clearly stand
out: First, as mentioned, the contributions in 2009 were based on a
windfall endowment provided by the NGO, while the contributions in
2005 were paid out of the households' existing wealth. Second, the
2009 experiment involved a matching contribution by the involved
NGO. Such matching contributions, or seed money, have been shown
to increase voluntary contributions substantially (e.g., List and
Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Karlan and List, 2007).
Moving on to the 2010 event, we can observe that even fewer chose
to contribute than in 2005, in this case in terms of labor contributions. In
2010, the mean contribution of labor was 0.5 labor days per household,
which corresponds to about 40,000 dong based on an average daily
labor wage of 80,000 dong. Finally, in the 2011 experiment, there is
again a small share of people contributing nothing, where the mean
contribution is substantial, 125,000 dong. The mean contribution as a
fraction of the maximum contribution is actually quite similar to the
2009 experiment; these events also share the features that they are con-
cerned with voluntary ﬁnancial contributions to a public good and that
the contributions are based on windfall endowments.
The contribution levels in the 2011 experiment are clearly unusually
high compared with what is typically found in public good lab experi-
ments, in particular given the small marginal per capita return. There
are several potential reasons for this. Contributions in one-shot public
good experiments are typically larger than average contributions in
multi-round public good experiments (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter,
2010). Also, there is some evidence that non-student samples might be
more cooperative and show higher levels of reciprocation than student
samples (e.g., Gächter et al., 2004; Falk et al., 2013).Moreover, the partic-
ipants in this particular non-student samplemay know each other better
than most students participating in lab experiments, and there is (not
surprisingly) evidence that subjects tend to behave more pro-socially
when the social distance to the other subjects is small (e.g., Hoffman
et al., 1996). Finally, it is also possible that the fact that the experiment
took place in the subjects' homesmay have induced stronger psycholog-
ical pressure to contribute than if it had been undertaken in a common
venue, which appears natural given the evidence that subjects' contribu-
tions tend to be affected by whether or not the experimenters directly
observe the contributions (List et al., 2004; Alpizar et al., 2008).
Yet, we are not primarily interested in the various contribution
levels, or whether these levels are similar across decisions. Instead we
want to ﬁnd out to what extents decisions are correlated, i.e., whether
or not those households that contribute more in one event also tend
to contribute more in another.
3.2. Raw contribution correlations between the events
As described above, we observe the contributions in each of the
events at the household level. As a ﬁrst step, we therefore analyze the
simple pair-wise correlations between the four events. Remember
that, for each household, we have three observations of contributions
to the bridge and one observation of contribution in a public good ex-
periment. We present correlation coefﬁcients for the whole sample
and for the restricted sample of households that had the possibility to
Table 2
Household characteristics.
Variables Deﬁnitions Mean Std. dev.
Household size Number of household members 3.84 1.61
No labor =1 if household cannot provide labor for community work 0.19
Age Age of household head in year 48.9 13.8
Male =1 if household head is male 0.63
Education Highest level of education attained: 1 = no schooling (5%); 2 = grades 1–5 (54%);
3 = grades 6–9 (31.5%); 4 = grades 10–12 (9%); 5 = vocational school and above (0.5%)
2.46 0.76
Monthly income Monthly household monetary income in hundred thousand dong 18.13 12.78
Use the bridge everydayb =1if use bridge everyday 0.19
Use the bridge 1–3 times a weeka =1 if use bridge about 1–3 times a week 0.10
Use the bridge twice a month =1 if use bridge about 2 times a month 0.17
Use the bridge once a month =1 if use bridge about 1 time a month 0.30
Member of the communist party =1 if at least one household member is a member of the communist party 0.10
Member of a local association =1 if at least one household member is a member of a local association 0.49
Rice land Total size of rice land currently being cultivated; in congs (1 cong = 1/10 ha) 4.69 3.13
a The options for the question regarding current use of the bridge were: 1 = Every day, 2 = About two to three times a week, 3 = About once a week, 4 = About twice a month,
5 = About once a month or less, 6 = Currently do not use the bridge at all. Since relatively few respondents chose options 2 and 3, we merged them in the descriptive statistics and
in the analysis.
b We also have ameasure of the physical distance from each home to the bridge. However, this measure never contributed signiﬁcantly to explain contributions to the bridge. There are
several potential reasons for this: For example, some farmers live on the same side of the bridge as their rice ﬁeld, while others live on the opposite side, and the same applies for house-
holds with kids related to the position of the school. Hence, we do not include that variable in the analysis.
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butions, we set the contribution to zero when calculating the correla-
tions for the whole sample. Table 3 presents the pair-wise correlation
coefﬁcients.
Despite the large differences in contribution levels between the
events, including in the fraction that did not contribute anything, the
correlation coefﬁcients between the four events are substantial and in
most cases highly signiﬁcant. For the events related to the bridge, the
largest correlation coefﬁcients are found between the 2005 and 2010
events. This may seem surprising since the 2005 event concerns mone-
tary contributions, while the 2010 event concerns labor days. Also, it
seems likely that some people have a comparative advantage in labor
contributions, implying that there is scope for a degree of specialization0
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Fig. 4. Histograms of contribuin contributions,which should reduce the correlation coefﬁcient. Our fa-
vorite explanations for the large correlation coefﬁcient are as follows:
First, in both cases the subjects had to pay with their own resources
(money and time, respectively), and hence there were no windfall re-
sources obtained for the individual decision. Second, and perhaps even
more importantly, both of these events were non-anonymous, and if
some people are more sensitive to the peer pressure to contribute,
then they should contribute more than others in both instances, imply-
ing a positive effect on the correlation coefﬁcient. Indeed, Alpizar et al.
(2008) demonstrate in a ﬁeld setting that anonymity matters for chari-
table contributions and Andreoni and Rao (2011) found more recently
that communication per se seems to dramatically affect altruistic behav-
ior, primarily through increased empathy.0
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tions in the four events.
Table 3
Correlation coefﬁcients between contributions for the different events.
Whole sample (N = 196)
Contribution 2005 Contribution 2009 Contribution 2010 Contribution 2011
Contribution 2005 1.00
Contribution 2009 0.28⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Contribution 2010 0.37⁎⁎⁎ 0.22⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Contribution 2011 0.20⁎⁎⁎ 0.28⁎⁎⁎ 0.14⁎⁎ 1.00
Restricted sample (N = 161)
Contribution 2005 Contribution 2009 Contribution 2010 Contribution 2011
Contribution 2005 1.00
Contribution 2009 0.25⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Contribution 2010 0.41⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ 1.00
Contribution 2011 0.22⁎⁎⁎ 0.30⁎⁎⁎ 0.12 1.00
⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎ denote that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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other three events are also substantial, with the exception of the event
involving labor contributions in 2010. Here, the coefﬁcient is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant at conventional levels when based on the restricted
sample. There may be several reasons for this, in addition to the fact
that only one of the two is related to the bridge: one concerns labor con-
tributions while the other concerns monetary contributions, one is
anonymous while the other is not, and one was conducted based on
windfall money while the other was not. Yet, it is interesting to see
that the correlation coefﬁcients between the contributions in 2005
and 2011 and between the contributions in 2009 and 2011 are large
and statistically signiﬁcant, despite the large differences in set-up. To-
gether, this clearly shows (i) that the strong correlations between the
events cannot only be due to the fact that they concern contributions
to a similar good, i.e., the bridge, and (ii) that there is clear support for
the idea that social preferences reﬂect traits that to a large extent are
constant over time and domains.Table 4
Low, Intermediate and High contributors in the events 2009, 2010, and 2011 for those who we
Sample based on Low
contributors in 2005a
(n = 93)
Contribution in 2009 (dong)
Low contributor (≤100,000) 23
(25%)
Intermediate (N100,0000 & ≤400,000) 39
(42%)
High contributor (=400,000) 31
(33%)
Contribution in 2010 (labor days)
Low contributor (=0) 84
(90%)
Intermediate (N0 & b2) 5
(5%)
High contributor (≥2) 4
(4%)
Contribution in 2011 (dong)
Low contributor (≤50,000) 28
(30%)
Intermediate (N50,0000 & b400,000) 35
(38%)
High contributor (=400,000) 30
(32%)
a Those who contributed 0 dong 2005.
b Those who contributed more than 0 but less than or equal to 100,000 dong 2005.
c Those who contributed more than 100,000 dong 2005.3.3. Simple comparisons of Low, Intermediate and High contributors'
behavior over time
Correlation coefﬁcients are not always straightforward to inter-
pret, in particular as in our case where the contribution patterns
are very different between the events and where large fractions of
the subjects chose the extreme alternatives of contributing zero or
the full amount. We therefore also illustrate the stability of social
preferences by investigating how subjects who initially contributed
small or large amounts in 2005 contributed in the three subsequent
events. Based on the histograms above it appears natural to classify
those who contributed strictly more than 100,000 dong as High con-
tributors, implying that 9% of the subjects are characterized as High
contributors in 2005. Since as many as 47% of the subjects contribut-
ed zero in 2005, this constitutes a natural (albeit quite large) group
of Low contributors (implying that the remaining 44% are classiﬁed
as Intermediate contributors).re characterized as Low, Intermediate and High contributors in 2005.
Sample based on Intermediate
contributors in 2005b
(n = 90)
Sample based on High
contributors in 2005c
(n = 17)
17 0
(19%) (0%)
33 2
(37%) (12%)
40 15
(44%) (88%)
65 4
(72%) (24%)
14 7
(16%) (41%)
11 6
(12%) (35%)
16 1
(18%) (6%)
39 2
(43%) (12%)
36 14
(39%) (82%)
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ﬁed as Low, Intermediate or High contributors. For the event in 2009,
Low contributors are those contributing less than or equal to 100,000
dong (20% of the subjects) whereas High contributors are those who
contributed the maximum amount 400,000 dong (43% of the subjects).
For the event in 2010, Low contributors are those who did not provide
any labor days (77% of the subjects) and High contributors are those
who provided two or more labor days (11% of the subjects). Finally,
for the event in 2011, Low contributors are deﬁned as those who con-
tributed less than or equal to 50,000 dong (22% of the subjects) and
High contributions are those who provided the maximum contribution
200,000 dong (40% of the subjects).
Table 4 reports the shares of Low, Intermediate and High contribu-
tors in the events 2009 to 2011 based on three different samples,
those who in 2005 are classiﬁed as Low, Intermediate, or High contrib-
utors, respectively.
In general, we ﬁnd strong links between contributing behavior in the
2005 event and the behavior in the subsequent events. Since the overall
fractions of Low and High contributors are different from each other in
each of the experiments the relevant comparisons to make are between
the different samples, i.e., to compare the different shares horizontally.13
That is, we want to compare whether those who in 2005 are classiﬁed as
a High contributors are more likely to be classiﬁed as a High contributors
in the three subsequent events than what those who are classiﬁed as a
Low contributor in 2005 are. Correspondingly, we want to compare
whether those who in 2005 are classiﬁed as a Low contributor are more
likely to be classiﬁed as a Low contributor in the subsequent events than
what those who are classiﬁed as a High contributor in 2005 are. As can
be seen in Table 4, the pattern follows expectation for each of the six cases.
For example, it is striking to compare the non-anonymous voluntary
contributions to the bridge in 2005 with the contributions in the anon-
ymous public good game (not related to the bridge) six years later. Of
those classiﬁed as Low contributors 2005, 32% are classiﬁed asHigh con-
tributors 2011. This can be compared with those classiﬁed as High con-
tributors in 2005, where as many as 82% are classiﬁed as a High
contributor 2011. Similarly, of those classiﬁed as Low contributors
2005, 30% are also classiﬁed as Low contributors 2011. This can be com-
paredwith those classiﬁed as High contributors in 2005where as few as
6% are classiﬁed as a Low contributor 2011.
In order to formally test whether these differences are statistically
signiﬁcant, we focus on the two samples of Low and High contributors
in 2005. We can then use simple Chi-square tests when comparing
the distribution of Low, Intermediate and High contributors for each of
the 2009, 2010 and 2011 events. For example, we can test if there is
no difference in the distribution of Low, Intermediate and High contrib-
utors in the 2009 event for those that were Low contributors in 2005
and those that were High contributors in 2005. In all three cases, i.e.
for each of the events in 2009, 2010 and 2011, we can reject the null hy-
pothesis that the distribution is independent of whether a subject was
classiﬁed as a Low or High contributor in 2005, at the 1% level.143.4. Econometric analysis
While the strong positive correlation coefﬁcients, as well as contri-
bution patterns more generally, between contributions in the ﬁrst13 For example, it does not say thatmuch that among thosewho are classiﬁed as High con-
tributors in 2005, 88% are classiﬁed as High contributors in 2009, and no one is classiﬁed as
Low contributors in 2009, since there are overallmore subjects in 2009 that are characterized
as High contributors than who are characterized as Low contributors. Similarly, it does not
saymuch that among thosewho are classiﬁed as Low contributors in 2005 there are actually
slightlymore subjects in 2011who are classiﬁed as High contributors thanwho are classiﬁed
as Low contributors, since there are overall more people in 2011 who are characterized as
High contributors than who are characterized as Low contributors.
14 Chi-squarednumbers and corresponding probabilityﬁgures for eachof the three cases
2009, 2010 and 2011 are 18.07 (p-value= 0.000), 40.08 (p-value= 0.000) and 15.07 (p-
value = 0.001) respectively.three events (i.e., those related to the bridge) are interesting per se,
one should be hesitant to interpret these coefﬁcients as clear evidence
of stability of social preferences. Indeed, there are several possible inter-
pretations of these positive correlations. For example, if the households
using the bridge the most are also willing to contribute the most (e.g.,
for partly selﬁsh reasons), we should obtain a positive correlation be-
tween contributions in the ﬁrst three events even if there are actually
no differences between the households in terms of underlying social
preferences. Still, the use of the bridge can of course not explain the cor-
relation coefﬁcients between contribution in the public good experi-
ment in 2011 (which was not related to the bridge) and contributions
in any of the other events.
We deal with this problem in two ways: First, as mentioned, we run
a public good experimentwithout any reference to the bridge, based on
the same sample. Second, we use regression techniques correcting for
possible explanatory variables that can be assumed to vary across the
households but at the same time are independent of underlying differ-
ences in social preferences. The most obvious variable here is the use
of the bridge.
More speciﬁcally, we use multivariate tobit regressions since we
have non-negligible shares of subjects who either contribute the full
amount or do not contribute at all; hence, we use truncations at both
zero and the full amount for the experiments in 2009 and 2011, and at
zero for the events in 2005 and 2010. Using amultivariatemodel, we es-
timate the correlation coefﬁcients of the error terms for each event.
These error terms are assumed to reﬂect the part of social preferences
that cannot be explained in terms of our explanatory variables used in
the regressions. Moreover, simple correlations do not take into account
that therewere different treatments in the experiment in 2009. In order
to deal with these issues, we estimate multivariate models where the
four equations are estimated simultaneously, allowing for a correlation
between the error terms of each of the equations, andwhere the depen-
dent variables are censored.
We present three sets of regressions: In the ﬁrst set, we use no ex-
planatory variables (except for an intercept). In the second set, we use
only variables reﬂecting the use of the bridge in the ﬁrst three events,
since these variables presumably vary across the households and at
the same time are independent of underlying differences in social pref-
erences. For the second and fourth event we also include treatment
dummy variables and experimentalist dummy variables. Finally, we
present a third set of regressions including all relevant explanatory var-
iables. In this last set, we thus face the risk of “over-compensation” in
the sense that there may exist variables, such as age and income, that
are correlated with true underlying social preferences. For example,
suppose that all actual variations in social preferences are determined
by gender. If we then correct for gender in the regressions, the result
would indicate that there is no stability of social preferences over time
even though the actual stability through gender may be large. Yet, as
is the case when not including any explanatory variables, it constitutes
a natural benchmark case.
We focus mainly on the sample of households that had the possibil-
ity to contribute labor in 2010. However, we also report the results
based on the full sample, where we have hence set the contribution in
labor to zero in 2010 for those who were not asked to contribute. We
also use the full dataset for the pairwise correlations that do not include
the2010 event. Yet, as can be observed, the results turned out fairly sim-
ilar.15 The estimated correlation coefﬁcients for our three sets of multi-
variate regressions are presented in Table 5, for each separate event.
Startingwith the ﬁrst three events, we can observe that the pairwise
correlation coefﬁcients are consistently positive, substantial, and statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Consequently, even when controlling for a number of15 We also estimated a bivariate tobit model wherewe only included themonetary con-
tributions in 2005 and 2009 based on the full sample of 200 subjects. The results do not
differ in any substantial way compared with what we will present in the main text here
and are thus not reported, but are available upon request.
16 From the deﬁnition of the correlation coefﬁcient, we have that ρ ¼ cov x1 ;x2ð Þstd x1ð Þstd x2ð Þ ¼E x1x2ð Þ−E x1ð Þ E x2ð Þ
std x1ð Þ std x2ð Þ , where xi is the contribution to charity i. Fromour assumptions, it follows that
E(x1x2) = 0.5 × 0.2 ⋅ 0.2 = 0.02, E(x1) = E(x2) = 0.5 ⋅ 0.2 = 0.1, and std(x1) std(x2) =
(std(x1))2 = var(x1) = 0.1 ⋅ 0. 92 + 0.9 ⋅ 0. 12 = 0.09. Hence, ρ ¼ 0:02−0:010:09 ≈0:11.
Table 5
Estimated pairwise correlation coefﬁcients between the error terms from multivariate tobit regressions (number of draws = 200); dependent variables are contributions in the four
events.
No variables (except intercept) Only use-the-bridge variables All variables
2005 2009 2010 2011 2005 2009 2010 2011 2005 2009 2010 2011
Treatment dummy variables No No No No No Included No No No Included No No
Experimentalist dummy variables No No No No No Included No Included No Included No Included
Socio-economic variables No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Restricted sample (N = 161)
2005 1 1 1
2009 0.36⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
1 0.33⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
1 0.30⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
1
2010 0.49⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.33⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
1 0.47⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.25⁎⁎
(0.10)
1 0.41⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.19⁎
(0.11)
1
2011 0.28⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.33⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.16
(0.10)
1 0.22⁎⁎
(0.10)
0.37⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.04
(0.12)
1 0.22⁎⁎
(0.10)
0.39⁎⁎⁎
(0.10)
−0.04
(0.13)
1
Whole sample (N = 196)
2005 1 1 1
2009 0.38⁎⁎⁎
(0.07)
1 0.33⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
1 0.29⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
1
2010 0.49⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.30⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
1 0.47⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.25⁎⁎
(0.09)
1 0.42⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.19⁎
(0.10)
1
2011 0.26⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.32⁎⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.19⁎⁎
(0.09)
1 0.22⁎⁎
(0.08)
0.30⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.08
(0.11)
1 0.19⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.28⁎⁎⁎
(0.09)
0.01
(0.11)
1
⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎ denote that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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there are strong correlations in behavior between the three events.
The relative sizes of these coefﬁcients follow expectations in that they
are generally largest when we do not correct for any variables, and
smallest when we include the full set of variables. Yet, the differences
between when we correct for the use-of-the-bridge variables and
when we do not are rather small. Again, the highest correlation coefﬁ-
cients are found between the 2005 and 2010 events, probably largely
due to the fact that these events were not anonymous, as discussed
previously.
Yet, it could still be the case that we did not manage to completely
correct for the usefulness of the bridge to different households, and
that the remaining part could explain the positive correlations. For
this reason,we have the fourth artefactualﬁeld public good experiment,
which is completely unrelated to the bridge. Here we again ﬁnd a weak
effect between 2010 and 2011 (we speculate about possible reasons
above), while the large and highly signiﬁcant correlations between con-
tributions in 2005 and 2011 and between contributions in 2009 and
2011 largely prevail after including various covariates. Consequently,
we can again conclude that it is not the fact that three of the four events
concerned the same underlying good, a bridge that explains the signiﬁ-
cant correlation between the contribution decisions.
Consider next the estimated coefﬁcients for the covariates. Table 6
presents the results for the restricted sample. Few of the household
characteristics have a signiﬁcant impact on the contributions in any of
the events and there are not any consistent patterns across the different
events (except for the use of the bridge). The contributions in 3 out of
the 4 events, including the public good experiment in 2011, are posi-
tively related to the amount of rice land owned. Monthly income, in
contrast, is only positively correlated with contribution in the public
good experiment. One may speculate about the reason for the differ-
ence. Perhaps it is more natural to relate to own income when making
the contribution decision in a non-framed public goods experiment
than when making decisions that are linked with the bridge. For the
2010 event, when people made contributions in terms of labor time, it
is not surprising that there is a negative effect of age. It is less expected
to ﬁnd a negative effect of the household head beingmale. As suggested
by a referee, a rough, indicative story can be given as follows: One does
not have to use the bridge very much to give out of the windfall, oneneeds to use it a little more to give labor (free), and one needs to use
it a lot to give money if poor.
3.5. Are the obtained correlation coefﬁcients large?
Despite the differences in context, whichwe know are likely to affect
the contribution levels, we ﬁnd substantial and inmost cases statistical-
ly signiﬁcant correlations among the four contribution decisions. Are
these correlation coefﬁcients large? We argue that they are. Indeed,
even if social preferences would be completely constant over time, we
would observe correlation coefﬁcients well below one. Consider a pop-
ulation divided equally between two types, selﬁsh and altruistic ones,
where the altruistic type gives to a charity with 20% probability as
soon as an opportunity is given, whereas the selﬁsh type never gives.
In this case it is easy to see that the correlation coefﬁcient between
the contributions to two different charities would be as low as 0.11.16
The reason for such a low value in this example (even though the actual
social preferences are completely stable) is of course that also the altru-
istic type often gives zero. In this perspective, the obtained correlation
coefﬁcients in the present paper are clearly substantial. For example,
we consistently ﬁnd that the correlation coefﬁcient between contribu-
tions in 2005 and six years later is as large as 0.2 or larger, despite the
fact that the contexts are very different, i.e., the public good in one of
these events was the beneﬁt of having a bridge while in the other it
was (ampliﬁed and shared) money, one of the events was anonymous
while the other was not, and one was conducted based on windfall
money while the other was not.
Yet we also ﬁnd, in line with several previous studies, that contribu-
tions are highly context dependent. Related to this, we ﬁnd that some
correlation coefﬁcients are substantially larger than others, whether
corrected for other explanatory variables or not. Perhaps most striking-
ly, we obtain a correlation coefﬁcient between voluntarymonetary con-
tribution in 2005 and voluntary labor contribution in 2010 in the order
of magnitude of 0.4 or larger, despite the fact that almost 50%
Table 6
Marginal effects (standard errors) from multivariate regressions; dependent variables are contributions in the three events. Number of observations = 163.
Only use-the-bridge variables All variables
2005 2009 2010 2011 2005 2009 2010 2011
Use the bridge every day 49.6⁎⁎
(22.2)
210.0⁎⁎⁎
(51.1)
1.75⁎⁎⁎
(0.66)
n.a. 41.8⁎⁎
(21.3)
213.7⁎⁎⁎
(51.1)
1.63⁎⁎⁎
(0.62)
Use the bridge 1–3 times a week 35.1
(27.4)
131.9⁎⁎
(62.6)
1.63⁎⁎
(0.79)
n.a. 23.0
(26.4)
111.4⁎
(61.9)
1.80⁎⁎
(0.76)
Use the bridge twice a month −3.1
(23.7)
111.5
(48.1)⁎⁎
−0.17
(0.75)
n.a. −3.8
(22.6)
120.6
(47.7)⁎⁎
−0.23
(0.71)
Use the bridge once a month 22.7
(19.8)
34.7
(41.6)
−0.11
(0.64)
n.a. 14.8
(18.9)
35.1
(41.1)
0.036
(0.60)
Household size −3.2
(4.9)
16.3
(11.3)
−0.021
(0.15)
3.50
(6.69)
Age −0.08
(0.67)
−0.39
(1.52)
−0.051⁎⁎
(0.02)
1.57
(0.87)
Male −12.5
(16.4)
18.6
(36.6)
−0.94
(0.47)⁎⁎
−24.3
(22.6)
Education 9.4
(9.7)
27.1
(23.9)
−0.38
(0.30)
−13.2
(12.8)
Monthly income −0.26
(0.57)
1.41
(1.46)
0.008
(0.016)
2.69⁎⁎⁎
(0.86)
Rice land 4.8⁎⁎
(2.3)
−0.83
(5.48)
0.160⁎⁎
(0.07)
9.24⁎⁎⁎
(3.21)
Member of the communist party 41.9⁎
(24.0)
90.0
(63.0)
0.80
(0.69)
12.0
(34.9)
Member of a local association 18.5
(15.2)
65.1
(36.0)
0.81⁎
(0.46)
−22.1
(20.1)
Treatment dummy variables No Included No No No Included No No
Experimentalist dummy variables No Included No Included No Included No Included
⁎⁎⁎ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ⁎⁎ at the 5% level, ⁎ at the 10% level.
113F. Carlsson et al. / Journal of Public Economics 117 (2014) 104–114contributed nothing in 2005 and over 70% (of the restricted sample that
were asked) contributed nothing in 2010. Our conjecture is that this
ﬁnding may not only reﬂect stability of social preferences, but also to
some extent stability of what may be called sensitivity to social pres-
sure, since none of these events were anonymous. This is an important
observation in its own right, and calls for further research. Overall, we
conclude that social preferences seem to be quite constant over long
periods of time.4. Conclusions
In this paper we have compared voluntary contributions to a public
good, in terms of a bridge in rural Vietnam, for the same complete sam-
ple of about 200 households in a village, at four different events span-
ning over a time period of 6 years. By doing so, we have been able to
avoid the potentially confounding factor related to moral licensing and
moral cleansing when measuring the extent of pro-social stability over
time. Overall, we ﬁnd substantial and highly signiﬁcant correlation coef-
ﬁcients, suggesting that pro-social preferences are quite constant over
long periods of time.
Although not our main research task, the substantial and positive
correlation between the unframed economic experiment and naturally
occurring events supports the idea that social preferences obtained in
economic experiments have validity also outside the somewhat artiﬁ-
cial experimental context. Although our events took place in a village
that is typical for this part of the world, it is an open question whether
there are large cultural differences in the extent to which social prefer-
ences are constant over long periods of time. Previous ﬁndings have
concluded that there are non-negligible differences in the strengths of
social preferences, as measured by economic experiments, in different
cultural contexts (e.g., Henrich et al., 2005, 2010). Our conjecture is
nevertheless that the extent to which social preferences vary over
time does not vary much culturally, although this is of course an open
question. For this and other reasons, we encourage further studies in
the ﬁeld in order to test the robustness of our ﬁndings.Acknowledgments
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